We give matching upper and lower bounds of Θ min log m log log m , n for the space and individual step complexity of a wait-free m-valued adopt-commit object implemented using multi-writer registers for n anonymous processes. While the upper bound is deterministic, the lower bound holds for randomized adopt-commit objects as well. Our results are based on showing that adopt-commit objects are equivalent, up to small additive constants, to a simpler class of objects that we call weak conflict-detectors.
INTRODUCTION
An adopt-commit object [2] or ratifier [3] is a one-shot shared-memory object that represents the adopt-commit * Supported in part by NSF grant CCF-0916389. † Supported in part by the Natural Science and Engineering Research Council of Canada.
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. To copy otherwise, to republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. SPAA'11, June 4-6, 2011, San Jose, California, USA. Copyright 2011 ACM 978-1-4503-0743-7/11/06 ...$10.00.
protocols of [14] and can be used to implement round-based protocols for set-agreement and consensus. An m-valued adopt-commit object supports a single operation, adoptCommit (u), where u is an input from a set of m values. The result of this operation is an output of the form (commit, v) or (adopt, v) , where the first component is a decision bit that indicates whether the process should decide value v immediately or adopt it as its preferred value in later rounds of the protocol. Improving the performance of adopt-commit objects can improve the performance of consensus protocols that use them. In addition, as observed in [3] , lower bounds on adopt-commit objects also yield immediate lower bounds on consensus.
The requirements for an adopt-commit object are:
1. Validity. Every operation's output equals some operation's input.
2.
Termination. Every operation finishes its operation in a finite number of steps with probability 1, where the probability is taken over the coin tosses performed by the algorithm.
3. Coherence. 1 If some operation returns (commit, v), every operation returns either (adopt, v) or (commit, v).
4.
Convergence. If all inputs are v, all operations return (commit, v).
These requirements are closely related to the validity, termination, and agreement requirements for consensus. The difference is that agreement (which requires that all processes obtain the same output) is replaced by the weaker requirements of coherence and convergence. As observed in [3] , this means that consensus objects satisfy the requirements of adopt-commit objects. It follows that lower bounds on adopt-commit objects immediately give lower bounds on consensus objects.
Until now, the best implementations of m-valued adoptcommit objects had Θ(n) individual step complexity, for n processes [14] or Θ(log m) individual step complexity, for any number of processes [3] . Both these implementations are deterministic, but the latter is also anonymous. This means that all processes run the same code. Differences between the behaviour of two different processes can arise only as a result of different input values, (different supplies of random bits, in the case of a randomized protocol), and when 1 The definition of adopt-commit objects in [2] uses the term agreement for this property. We use agreement instead for the stronger unconditional agreement property of consensus objects. The term coherence is from [3] . they are scheduled. A number of advantages of anonymity are are discussed in [5] .
Here, we consider how much further we can improve the complexity of an implementation of an adopt-commit object without losing anonymity. We give two simple, deterministic, anonymous protocols for detecting multiple input values, from which we obtain implementations of m-valued adopt-commit objects. One of these has O(n) individual step complexity, given an upper bound, n, on the number of processes. The other has O log m log log m individual step complexity, for any number of processes. While this is only a small improvement in complexity, we show a matching lower bound on the individual step complexity of any anonymous implementation (including randomized implementations against an oblivious adversary) of an m-valued adoptcommit object that supports at least Ω log m log log m processes.
Our lower bound also implies a lower bound of Ω log m log log m on the individual step complexity for anonymous randomized consensus with sufficiently many processes, even against an oblivious adversary.
CONFLICT DETECTORS
The implementation of an adopt-commit object in [3] relies on a quorum-based conflict detection mechanism, where each process with value v writes to a set of registers Wv and detects conflicting values by reading a set of registers Rv, with the property that Wv ∩ R v = ∅ when v = v . It is shown there that the smallest possible size for these quorums is Θ(log m), using tools from extremal combinatorics. The quorum-based mechanism generalizes a similar mechanism in [14] , where a process detects conflicting values by performing a collect over single-writer registers, which requires individual step complexity linear in the number of processes.
If we set aside the quorum structure, we can define an abstract conflict-detector object as a generalization of these mechanisms. We begin with a linearizable version that can be used as a drop-in replacement for existing conflict detection mechansims. Then we further reduce it to a weaker (and, thus, easier to implement) version that does not satisfy linearizability.
Formally, an m-valued strong conflict-detector supports two operations, write(v), for inputs v from a set of m values, and read(), where read() returns true (conflict) if two or more different values have previously been written and returns false (no conflict), otherwise. These operations must appear to be atomic to the user of the strong conflictdetector. Specifically, we require that any strong conflictdetector implementation be linearizable [15] , meaning that, for any concurrent execution of strong conflict-detector operations, we can construct a sequential execution with the same operations such that each operation returns the same response in both executions and non-concurrent operations in the original execution occur in the same order as in the sequential execution.
Linearizability is sometimes difficult to prove. To make things simpler, we show that strong conflict-detectors can be built from even weaker objects, which we call weak conflict-detectors. An m-valued weak conflict-detector supports only a single operation check(v), with input v from a set of m values. It returns true (to indicate a conflict) or false (to indicate no conflicts), and has the following two properties: In any execution that contains a check(v) operation and a check(v ) operation with v = v , at least one of these two operations returns true. In any execution in which all check operations have the same argument, they all return false. For weak conflict-detectors, we do not require linearizability: it is fine for one check operation to return true while subsequent check operations return false.
2.1 Equivalence of adopt-commit objects, strong conflict-detectors, and weak conflict-detectors
We show that the individual step complexities of adoptcommit objects, strong conflict-detectors, and weak conflictdetectors differ by small additive constants. Because our reductions are anonymous, this also holds for anonymous implementations. We use TadoptCommit, Twrite, Tread, and Tcheck to denote the worst case step complexities of the adoptCommit, write, read, and check operations.
We give implementations of a weak conflict-detector from an adopt-commit object, a strong conflict-detector from a weak conflict-detector, and finally an adopt-commit object from a strong conflict-detector. We begin by showing how to implement a weak conflict-detector from an adopt-commit object. This is is the simplest case, since neither of these objects is required to satisfy linearizability. The code is presented in Figure 1 .
adopt-commit object r; Proof. If all check operations have the same input v, then, they all call r.adoptCommit(v), which, by the convergence property, all return (commit, v). In this case, all the check(v ) operations return false. If there are two operations, check(v) and check(v ), with v = v , then, they call r.adoptCommit(v) and r.adoptCommit(v ), respectively. By coherence, it is not possible for (commit, v) to be the result of r.adoptCommit(v) and for (commit, v ) to be the result of r.adoptCommit(v ) in the same execution. It follows that true is returned by at least one of the two check operations. Thus, Algorithm 1 implements a weak conflict-detector.
The step complexity of check is the same as the step complexity of adoptCommit, since only Line 3 contains a nonlocal operation.
To extend a weak conflict-detector to a strong conflictdetector, we add a one-bit register, conflict, which is set to true whenever a write operation detects a conflict. The code for read and write is presented in Algorithm 2. To carry out a read operation, a process simply reads the conflict bit and returns its value. We show, in Lemma 2, that this does, in fact, give a strong (i.e., linearizable) conflictdetector. Proof. The running time is immediate from the code. To show that Algorithm 2 implements a strong conflictdetector, we give an explicit linearization of the read and write operations in any execution. The linearization point, tr, of a read operation, r, is the time at which it reads register conflict. Let τ be the first time during the execution at which some process sets conflict to true, or +∞, if there is no such time. For each write operation w, let sw be the time at which the write operation starts. The linearization point, tw, of operation w is defined to be max(sw, τ ), if w sets conflict to true, and sw, otherwise.
We show that these assigned times (with ties broken arbitrarily) gives a correct linearization. A write operation that sets conflict to true is linearized when it starts or at the first time in the execution that some process sets conflict to true, whichever is later. Note that this occurs at or before the end of the operation. All other operations are linearized when they start. This linearization order is consistent with the observable execution order.
Recall that τ is the time at which conflict is set to true. Any read that is linearized before τ reads false from conflict. Similarly, any read that is linearized after τ reads true from conflict. We satisfy the specification of the strong conflictdetector if (a) at most one distinct value appears as an argument to any write operation linearized strictly before τ and (b) if τ = +∞, then at least two different values appear as arguments to write operations linearized at or before time τ .
To be linearized before τ , a write(v ) operation must not set conflict to true and, hence, its call to d.check(v ) must return false. But the specification of a weak conflictdetector implies that all d.check operations which return false must have the same input value. It follows that all write operations linearized before τ have the same input value. This proves (a). If τ = +∞, then some write operation, w, sets conflict to true at time τ and tw = max(sw, τ ) = τ . This write operation previously completed a call to d.check that returned true. If all calls to d.check that started before τ have the same input value, then we can truncate the execution at time τ and allow all check operations to run to completion. This results in an execution of the weak conflict-detector d in which all calls to d.check have the same input value, but some call to d.check returns true, which violates the specification of a weak conflict-detector. Hence, there are two calls to d.check with different input values that started before τ . Thus, there must be two corresponding write operations w and w with different input values that also started before τ . These are assigned linearization points max(sw, τ ) = max(s w , τ ) = τ . This proves (b).
Finally, Algorithm 3 completes the cycle by showing how to turn an anonymous strong conflict-detector into an adoptcommit object, with the addition of an extra register for holding proposed values. The mechanism is essentially the same as in the adopt-commit implementation given in [3] , with a generic strong conflict-detector taking the place of the quorum-based mechanism used there.
shared data:
register proposal, initially ⊥; strong conflict-detector c. Since the specification of a weak conflict-detector is simpler than those of strong conflict-detectors or adopt-commit objects, it will be easiest to obtain bounds on their complexity by concentrating on weak conflict-detectors.
UPPER BOUNDS ON ANONYMOUS WEAK CONFLICT-DETECTORS
In this section, we give two complementary implementations of anonymous m-valued weak conflict-detectors. The first uses O log m log log m steps for any number of processes, while the second uses O(n) steps, for any value of m, where n is an upper bound on the number of processes. By choosing the first implementation when m is small and the second when m is large, we obtain a weak conflict-detector that runs in O min log m log log m , n steps, which we show to be optimal in Section 4.
Permutation-based weak conflict-detector
shared data: Proof. If all calls to check have the same input value v, then only v will be written to each register R[i] and no process ever observes any value other than v or ⊥. In this case, all operations correctly return false. Now suppose there is an execution E in which two processes, pu and p u , with different input values, u and u , both return false. Then both processes read from all of the registers R[1], . . . , R[k] and the values u and u will both be written to all of the registers. Let j, j ∈ {1, . . . , k} be two indexes such that j occurs before j in πu, but j occurs before j in π u . If u is written to R[j] before u is written to R[j ] in E, then, when p u or any other process with value u reads R[j], it will not see ⊥. This is because, before it reads R[j], it either writes u to R[j ] or reads u from R[j ]. This implies that no process writes u to R[j], which is a contradiction.
Therefore u is written to R[j ] before u is written to R[j]. But, then, no process writes u to R[j ], which is also a contradiction.
Collect-based weak conflict-detector
Algorithm 5 is another implementation of a weak conflictdetector. It places no limit on the number of distinct values m, but it works only when an upper bound, n, on the number of processes is known. The worst-case individual step complexity of a check(v) operation in Algorithm 5 is 3n+1. The essential idea is that once some process finishes the first loop in check(v) and sets done to true, each of the at most n − 1 other processes can write to at most one location in R before seeing done = true and leaving the loop. Because no process executes the collect in the second loop until done = true, any views obtained by two different processes in this loop can differ in at most n − 1 places. It follows that no two processes with different inputs can both see their own input in all n positions during the collect. Therefore, at least one of them will return true. If all calls to check have the same input, then only this input will appear in R, so all the calls will return false.
More formally, we have shown:
Lemma 5. Algorithm 5 implements a weak conflictdetector.
LOWER BOUND ON ANONYMOUS WEAK CONFLICT-DETECTORS
In this section, we show that any m-valued weak conflict-detector for n anonymous processes has Ω min log m log log m , n worst-case solo step complexity. Fix some anonymous, deterministic implementation of an m-valued weak conflict-detector. For each input value v, we consider the solo execution Ev in which a process executes check(v ) starting from the initial configuration. Note that, because processes are deterministic and anonymous, the sequence of operations in Ev is fully determined by v.
Let kv be the step complexity of Ev. Let Wv be the set of registers that a process writes to in Ev and let Xv be the set of registers that it reads from but does not write to. Let Av be the permutation of Wv ∪ Xv arranged in the order in which the registers in Wv are first written and the registers in Xv are last read in Ev.
Lemma 6. For all distinct input values u and v, if ku + kv ≤ n, then there exist two registers Ri, Rj ∈ (Wu ∪ Xu) ∩ (Wv ∪ Xv) that occur in different orders in Au and Av.
Proof. Suppose there are two input values u = v such that ku + kv ≤ n and all registers Ri, Rj ∈ (Wu ∪ Xu) ∩ (Wv ∪ Xv) occur in the same order in Au and Av. We show that an adversary can construct an execution E involving ku + kv ≤ n processes that is indistinguishable from Eu to some process pu performing check(u) and indistinguishable from Ev to some other process pv performing check(v ). In this execution, both pu and pv return false, violating the specification of a weak conflict-detector.
For each Ri ∈ Wu ∩ (Wv ∪ Xv), let σi,u be the first write to Ri in Eu and, for each Ri ∈ Xu ∩ (Wv ∪ Xv), let σi,u be the last read from Ri in Eu. Let Su = {σi,u | Ri ∈ (Wu ∪ Xu) ∩ (Wv ∪ Xv)}. Define σi,v and Sv analogously.
The adversary starts by constructing an interleaving E of the operations in Eu and Ev. The operations in E appear in the same order as in Eu. Hence E |pu = Eu. The adversary schedules each read operation σi,v ∈ Sv immediately before σi,u and schedules each write operation σi,v ∈ Sv immediately after σi,u. Note that, by assumption, the operations in Sv appear in the same order in E as they do in Ev, namely, in the order the registers Ri ∈ (Wu ∪ Xu) ∩ (Wv ∪ Xv) they access occur in Au and Av.
If no operations in Sv occur between σi,v and σj,v, then, in E , the adversary arbitrarily interleaves the operations in Ev that occur strictly between σi,v and σj,v with the operations in Eu that occur strictly between σi,u and σj,u. Likewise, the adversary arbitrarily interleaves the operations in Ev that occur before the first operation in Sv with the operations in Eu that occur before the first operation in Su and the operations in Ev that occur after the last operation in Sv with the operations in Eu that occur after the last operation in Su. Hence E |pv = Ev.
The sequence of operations in E is not necessarily a valid execution, because pu may read a value written by pv or pv may read a value written by pu. To prevent this, we add clones, as used in [13] . A clone of a process p is a process with the same input and code as p, which proceeds in lockstep with p, reading and writing the same values as p, until immediately before some write to a register. The adversary has the clone perform that write at some later point in the execution to ensure that the value p reads from that register is the same as the value p last wrote there. After performing its delayed write, a clone performs no further steps.
For each register Ri ∈ Wu ∩ Wv, the adversary adds one clone of pu to E for each read of Ri by pu after σi,v and one clone of pv to E for each read of Ri by pv after σi,v. Let E be the resulting execution.
If Ri ∈ Wu ∩ Wv, then, by construction, any read of Ri by pu in E after σi,v sees the same value it saw in Eu, namely, the value it last wrote to Ri. Any read of Ri prior to σi,u sees the initial value of Ri, since σi,u and σi,v are, by definition, the first writes to Ri by pu and pv in E and, hence, E.
If Ri ∈ Xu ∩ Wv, then all reads of Ri by pu in E occur at or before σi,u and, hence, see the initial value of Ri, as they do in Eu. This is because, in E, all writes to Ri by pv occur at or after σi,v, which is after σi,u.
If
Similarly, Ev and E are indistinguishable to pv.
The following combinatorial lemma allows us to bound m as a function of the step complexities, kv, of the solo executions Ev. The proof is similar to Lubell's proof of Sperner's Lemma [16] .
Lemma 7. Let {A1, . . . , Am} be a set of finite sequences without repetition such that, for any two sequences Ai and Aj, there exist elements xi,j and yi,j that appear in different orders in Ai and Aj. Then
Ai be the set of all elements appearing in any of the sequences A1, . . . , Am. Choose an ordering of A uniformly at random. Let Xi be the indicator variable that has value 1, if the ordering of the elements in Ai is consistent with this ordering, and has value 0, otherwise. Let X = m i=1 Xi. Note that Xi = 1 implies that Xj = 0 for all j = i. This is because xi,j and yi,j appear in different orders in Ai and Aj. It follows that X ≤ 1.
For each sequence Ai, the probability that it is consistent with the chosen ordering is exactly
Theorem 8. The worst-case solo step complexity of any anonymous deterministic implementation of an mvalued weak conflict detector for n processes is at least min(fact −1 (m), n/2), where fact( ) = ! is the factorial function.
Proof. Fix any anonymous deterministic implementation of an m-valued weak conflict-detector for n processes and let k be its worst-case solo step complexity. Then, for every input value v, |Av| ≤ kv ≤ k.
If k > n/2, then the claim is true, so suppose that k ≤ n/2. Then, for all distinct inputs u and v, ku + kv ≤ n and, hence, by Lemma 6, there are two registers that occur in different orders in Au and Av. It follows from Lemma 7 that
Theorem 8 implies that Tcheck ≥ min(fact −1 (m), n/2). This matches the upper bound from Section 3 to within a small constant factor.
From Lemma 1, it follows that TadoptCommit ≥ Tcheck and, from Lemma 3, it follows that Twrite +Tread ≥ TadoptCommit −2. Thus, we get lower bounds for the individual step complexities of adopt-commit objects and strong conflict-detectors.
Lemma 2 says that Algorithm 2 implements a strong conflict-detector with Twrite ≤ Tcheck + 1 and Tread = 1, so Twrite + Tread ≤ TadoptCommit + 2. It is also possible to construct a strong conflict-detector with Twrite = 1 using one Boolean register Rv for each input value v. The idea is to have write(v) set Rv to true and have read() return true if at least two of these m registers are true. Note that, for this algorithm, Twrite + Tread = m + 1, which is much larger than the lower bound. It is still open whether an algorithm with constant Twrite and smaller Tread is possible.
Because the requirements for weak conflict-detectors are safety properties, we can show that the lower bound applies to randomized anonymous implementations of weak conflictdetectors as well.
Corollary 9. Given any anonymous randomized implementation of an m-valued weak conflict detector for n processes, there is an input v such that any solo execution of check(v) has step complexity at least min(fact −1 (m), n/2) with probability 1 against an oblivious adversary.
Proof. Suppose not. Then, for any input v, there is some sequence of coin-flip outcomes that causes a process pv with input v to complete a solo execution of check(v) in less than min(fact −1 (m), n/2) steps. For each v, let Ev be the execution of the deterministic protocol obtained by fixing the coin-flips to have these outcomes. The proof of Theorem 8 constructs a combined execution E in which two processes pu and pv with different inputs both return false. Such an execution occurs with nonzero probability in the randomized algorithm, because pu, pv, and all of their respective clones can generate these fixed sequences of coin-flip outcomes. This violates the correctness of the implementation.
The corresponding bounds also hold for anonymous randomized implementations of adopt-commit objects and strong conflict-detectors.
CONSEQUENCES FOR CONSENSUS
Here we consider the effect of our improved bounds for adopt-commit objects on the consensus problem. In the consensus problem, n processes must agree on a value, which must be equal to some process's input. A protocol is randomized wait-free if, in addition, any process can complete it in a finite expected number of steps, regardless of the timing of the other's processes' steps or the occurrence up to n − 1 crash failures.
The cost of consensus depends strongly on the power of the adversary scheduler that controls timing and process failures and, to a lesser extent, on the number of possible values. For an adaptive adversary, which can observe the internal states of the processes, there is a tight bound of Θ(n) on the individual step complexity of binary (twovalued) consensus [4, 6] . The high cost of consensus in this model has led to examination of models with weaker adversaries, particularly adversaries that are prevented from changing the schedule based on coin-flip values known only to one process.
One approach is to limit the adversary's ability to observe the state of the system. A value-oblivious adversary [8] [9] [10] cannot observe the internal states of processes, the contents of registers, or pending operations. It bases its choice of schedule only on the history of which operations the processes have applied to which registers. The best currently known protocol in this model, due to Aumann [8] , achieves consensus with O(log n) expected individual step complexity for any number of input values.
An alternative is to give extra power to the algorithm by allowing probabilistic writes [1, 11, 12] , where a process can flip a coin and choose to execute a write operation or not based on the outcome of the coin-flip, without affecting the scheduling done by the adversary. In this model, a protocol of Aspnes [3] , based on combining adopt-commit objects and a class of randomized objects called conciliators, gives an anonymous protocol for m-valued consensus with expected O(log m + log n) individual step complexity, where O(log m) is the cost of the adopt-commit and O(log n) is the cost of the conciliator using implementations given in [3] .
An oblivious adversary that must fix the schedule in advance, without seeing the actions of the processes, gives an even stronger model than both the value-oblivious and probabilistic-write models. (As observed in [3] , a process in an oblivious-adversary model can simulate a probabilistic write by choosing randomly between carrying out a write and a dummy operation.) In this model, Attiya and CensorHillel [7] have shown that any protocol with two input values runs for at least k steps with probability c −k for some constant c, a bound that translates into constant expected individual step complexity.
Our results improve the previous upper bound for the probabilistic-write model and give a non-trivial lower bound on expected individual step complexity for the obliviousadversary model when the number of input values m is ω(1). For the probabilistic-write model, substituting our improved adopt-commit implementation for the adopt-commit object in [3] reduces the expected individual step complexity from O(log m + log n) to O min log m log log m , n + log n . For the oblivious-adversary model, our lower bound on anonymous adopt-commit objects gives an immediate Ω min log m log log m , n lower bound with probability 1 on the worst-case individual step complexity of anonymous mvalued consensus implementations, because consensus objects satisfy the specification of adopt-commit objects. This is the first lower bound for consensus for which the number of values m is significant.
CONCLUSIONS
We have shown how to reduce adopt-commit objects to a much simpler class of weak conflict-detectors, and used this reduction to get tight bounds on the individual step complexity of anonymous m-valued adopt-commit objects. These bounds also translate into improved bounds on anonymous m-valued consensus. The natural question is what happens when the assumption of anonymity is removed. We conjecture that for unboundedly many processes, Ramseytheoretic techniques may be used to show that similar bounds hold. However, the complexity of non-anonymous adoptcommit objects is still unknown.
